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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
IN RE:
GEORGE E. BRIDWELL,
Disciplinary Proceeding

Case No.
11546

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal by a Utah attorney from an order by
the Utah State Bar Commission recommending disbarment.
DISPOSITION BY COMMISSION
After a hearing before a three man Disciplinary Committee
which made Findings of Fact and a Conclusion of Law to the
effect that the attorney had violated the rules of the Utah State
Bar governing professional conduct, the Utah State Bar Commission reviewed same and entered an Order recommending
disbarment.
RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLEE
The appellee seeks affirmation of the Bar Commission's
recommendation and an Order disbarring the appellant.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Following is a panoramic view of the facts to give the Court
a general picture of the problem. As the specific Findings of
Fact of the Disciplinary Committee are discussed, the essential
facts will be treated in greater detail.
In 1957, the complainant, Eugene Wagner, acting for himself and Precisa Calculating Machine Company, a distributor of
adding machines and orthopedic knees, engaged Bridwell to
represent them in connection with charges brought by the
Internal Revenue Service ( R. 32). The company operated an
office in Salt Lake City ( R. 31). It was a small corporation
whose principal stockholders were an orthopedic appliance factory in Basel, Switzerland, its president and Wagner ( R. 34).
Wagner, a Swiss national converted to the Mormon faith, has
been doing business in Salt Lake City in connection with Swiss
and American companies since 1948 ( R. 28-32).
Shortly after Wagner and Precisa received deficiency notices
from the Internal Revenue Service, Wagner returned to Switzerland to check the books of his company there ( R. 32-3). On
advice of Bridwell, who was apprehensive of fraud implications
in the Internal Revenue Service charges, Wagner remained in
Switzerland for the next four years ( Exs. 1, 2, 5, 10, 16 and M).
Bridwell took over the management of the company in Salt
Lake and soon became the sole custodian of its bank account.
The Internal Revenue Service proceeded with its project.
Bridwell negotiated and the cases were all ultimately settled
by May 29, 1961, except Wagner's personal case involving his
1957 taxes, which was settled October 9, 1961 ( R. 436).
Initially Bridwell agreed to handle the cases through the
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administrative process for the sum of $14,000 (Ex. 1). Between
the fall of 1957, however, and September of 1958, he paid himself out of the Precisa bank account which he controlled, the
sum of $19,42.5.00, taking the extra $5,425.00 without knowledge
or pern1ission of Wagner or Precisa (Ex. F; R. 429, 70).
In October, 1958, Bridwell withdrew from Precisa funds
another $4,000.00 without the knowledge or permission of his
clients, ostensibly to finance a trip for himself and his accountant,
Frank Nielson, to Basel, Switzerland, to consult with Wagner
and examine books and records there ( R. 352; Ex. C).

Bridwell and Nielson worked in Basel for approximately
three weeks. By this time the company was not operating and
.'l
had no income. No financial statement was submitted to
Wagner (Ex. 6). He was not told how much remained in the
dwindling bank account. Bridwell asked for additional fees over
the $14,000.00 and was authorized to withdraw an additional
$3,000.00 to give him a total of $17,000.00 ( R.70). He did not
reveal that he had already withdrawn $23,425.00.
By May, 1959 or earlier, the bank account was entirely
depleted (Ex. 5).
Precisa was buying a building in Salt Lake on contract.
When the cash was gone, the contract payments lapsed and
the mortgagee foreclosed ( R. 364; Ex. 19B, 5). Bridwell persuaded the mortgagee to give Precisa an option to repurchase
at the same contract price. Then he arranged the sale of the
option to his close friend and client, Robert Schubach, who
purchased the property in 1959 ( Exs. 16, 17, 5, 19B).

In May, 1961, he informed Wagner for the first time of the
disposition of the property which had been accomplished two
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years before (Ex. 5). Wagner was furious (Ex. 6). He thought
the payments were still being made. In October, 1961, after
settlement of all the tax cases had been achieved, Bridwell urged
Wagner to borrow money in Switzerland so that he could buy
the property back from Bridwell at a cost of $45,000.00 (Ex. 16).
Schubach had bought it for $22,277.10. On October 29, 1961,
when Bridwell informed 'Vaguer it was safe to return to Salt
Lake because the tax cases had been settled (Ex. 17), Wagner
did so and had to pay Schubach $35,000.00 to repurchase the
building instead of $22,277.10, the price at which he could have
purchased it under the option agreement (Ex. 47). Schubach
had put some money into the property, but still made a profit
of $10,537.82 (R. 397).
Meantime the assets of Precisa had been sold by the Internal
Revenue Service to satisfy tax deficiencies, and when the cases
were settled, the government sent Precisa a refund check of
$15,520.70 to Bridwell on October 9, 1961. Without the knowledge or assent of Precisa or Wagner, Bridwell disbursed the
refund as follows: $1,392.34 to pay taxes of certain Precisa
Redwood Road property, $6,700.00 to his accountant, Frank
Nielson, and $7,428.36 to himself as additional attorney's fees
(Ex. 36). He did not inform Wagner or Precisa of the receipt
of the refund until Wagner's return to Salt Lake in November,
1961 ( R. 204, 376). Then he did not divulge its disbursement,
hnt claimed that it was in an attorney's trust account in his
office ( R. 204). Wagner asked that it be placed in a Precisa
Corporation checking account requiring his and Bridwell's signatures ( R. 204). When this was not done, Wagner hounded
Bridwell for an accounting of the refund (Ex. 41 ) , but it was
not until October 29, 1962, after Wagner had hired another
attorney to represent him against Bridwell and threatened to
rPport Bridwell to the Bar Association (Ex. 42) that Nielson,
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Bridwell's accountant, sent \,"\' agner a letter listing the threefold
di<;tribution of the $15,520.70 (Ex. 36).
Bridwell states that in midsummer of 1961, he became "assured" that all of the tax claims would be settled ( R. 358). As
a matter of fact, all of the cases against the corporation and
Wagner except Wagner's 1957 taxes were settled by May 29,
1961 ( R. 43.S) and Wagner's 1957 case was settled early in
October, 1961 ( R. 436). Bridwell cabled Wagner three times
demanding $2,000 to finance another trip to Basel. He finally
threatened Wagner that if he did not send the money, Wagner
might be exiled for life from the United States (Ex. 14). Wagner
finally sent the money (Ex. 15) and Bridwell went to Europe
alone in September, 1961. Wagner was furious that the corporation's cash and building were gone and he accused Bridwell
of stealing money ( R. 362). Bridwell convinced him that in
order to settle the tax cases, (which were already settled,) Wagner and all of the officers of Precisa would have to execute
corporate stockholder's meeting minutes which ratified the sale
of the building to Schubach and absolved Bridwell of any wrongdoing in connection with his representation of Wagner and
Precisa (Ex. 19B, 21). Under pressure Wagner and his colleagues
signed minutes prepared by Bridwell (Ex. 21).
In the course of Bridwell's handling of things "at home," he
committed other irregularities: (1) He bought a valuable Wagner-owned chandelier which the government was going to sell
at auction and gave it to Robert Schubach's father (R. 388-9);
( 2) he got a bar built in his basement at the expense of Precisa
( R. 408-9); and ( 3) he took funds collected by Dun & Bradstreet for Precisa and deposited them in his own personal bank
account instead of the corporation account (R. 400, 380-1; Exs.
27, 28, 28A, 29, 30, 31).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DELAY HAS NOT PREJUDICED THE APPELLANT
AND DOES NOT REQUIRE DISMISSAL.
~lr. Bridwell's claims regarding deprivation of speedy trial
and laches are adequately negatived by this court's opinion and
decision in the case of In re Steffensen, 78 P.2d 531, 8.5 Utah
380 ( 1938). In that case an attorney collected $60.00 for a client
and retained it, claiming as justification ( 1 ) that the client
owed him additional fees, ( 2) that he could not locate the
client, and ( 3) the client's delay in instituting the action through
the bar constituted !aches and unreasonable delay.

The attorney's own admissions eliminated the defense that
he had not been able to contact his client. The attorney collected
the money on November 11, 1930. The complaint by the Bar
Association was filed in May, 1935. With regard to the issue
of !aches and delay, the court said:
"In so far as the defense of !aches pleaded in defendant's answer is concerned, we do not find it sustained by
the facts in the record. As soon as the collection by the
attorney was known to the client, the latter was reasonably
active thereafter in bringing forward his insistence upon
a settlement from the attorney. When his own efforts failed,
he enlisted the friendly efforts of other attorneys and the
county attorney's office. When a man has employed and
paid one attorney to make a collection, he does not need
employ and pay another attorney to collect from the first
in order to demonstrate an earnestness and sincerity in
desiring to get possession of his own money. The matter
was kept before Mr. Steffensen's attention, if not constantly, at least with reasonable continuity from the time it
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was known he had collected on the Pingree claim. Such
delay as occurred, in pressing the claim, was due to or contributed to by the attorney's own necessitous circumstances
and was largely in his interest. H he lost files, or his memory has dimmed because of the delay, it would seem to be
a misfortune against which he might have guarded by a
reasonable appreciation of the outcome of his failure to
account for and pay what was due to his client."
In the case at bar the analogous fact exists that as soon as
the client, Mr. Wagner, returned to the United States from
Europe and discovered what he believed to be the unprofessional conduct of his lawyer, he "was reasonably active thereafter in bringing forward his insistence upon a settlement from
the attorney." In fact, he was more than "reasonably active."
According to Mr. Bridwell's own brief: "After the building
transaction had been completed (December 11, 1961), Wagner
came to Bridwell's office and made accusations of embezzlement. Bridwell told him to get out." (App. Br. p. 21). By letter
of September 24, 1962 (Ex. 24) Wagner warned Bridwell that
if he did not account for cash of the corporation in his possession, he would complain to the Bar Association.

Consequently, under the rationale of the Steffensen case,
Bridwell certainly had vigorous notice of the wrongdoing
charged. He had opportunity at that time to rectify the misconduct of which he was later found guilty by the Disciplinary
Committee and the Bar Commission. He had unmistakable
warning at that time that he could anticipate criminal, civil or
disciplinary action, and he had ample opportunity to assemble
and preserve any evidence which might assist him in his defense.
On May 6, 1963, he was informed of the letter of complaint
which had been filed against him. This is only a year and a
half after Wagner accused him of embezzlement. That was not
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too late for him to have assembled and preserved whatever
evidence he could in preparation for his defense.
Bridwell has not been prejudiced by any delay of prosecution.
There is an abundance of authority declaring that a disbarment proceeding is not affected by a statute of limitations
unless a specific statute has been enacted to cover such proceeding.
"b. Limitations and Laches. General statutes of limitations are not applicable to disciplinary proceedings,
although staleness of a charge may prevent its being considered. Special statutes, if valid, will bar the prosecution
of such a proceeding.
"The general statute of limitations is no defense to a
proceeding for the disbarment or suspension of an attorney, nor will the courts establish a limitation as to the
time in which such proceedings may be instituted by analogy to the statute of limitations unless, from the nature
or circumstances of the particular case, it appears that
it would be unjust or unfair to require the attorney to
answer as to such occurrences.
"Staleness in a charge against an attorney may prevent
its being considered, because an unreasonable delay in the
presentation of a charge of misconduct may make it impossible for an attorney to procure the witnesses or the testimony which would have been available at an earlier time
to meet such charge. However, the court will not refuse
to hear charges of unprofessional conduct against an attorney because of expiration of long period of time unless it
would be unjust to compel him to answer such charges."
7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, §25b, p. 766.

"62. Limitations and Laches. Disciplinary proc.eedings are not barred by the general statute of limitations.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
Nor is a disciplinary proceeding barred because it is
grounded on acts that also constitute a crime that cannot
be prosecuted in a criminal action because of limitations.
However, proceedings instituted a long time after the
commission of the act complained of are regarded with
disfavor." 7 Am. Jur. 2d, §62, p. 86.
"It seems, however, that, except in the few states
which have enacted specific statutes on the subject, there
is no limitation on the time for instituting disbarment proceedings, except the inherent power of the court to refuse
to hear an application to disbar which has been unreasonably delayed, a subject not within the scope of the
present discussion.

"It has been said generally in several cases that the
ordinary statutes of limitations have no application to a
disbarment proceeding. Re Lowenthal ( 1889) 78 Cal. 427,
21 Pac. 7; People ex rel. Stead v. Phipps ( 1913) 261 Ill.
576, 104 N.E. 144; Re Elliott ( 1906) 73 Kan. 151, 84 Pac.
750; Re Leonard ( 1908) 127 App. Div. 493, 111 N.Y. Supp.
905, affirmed in ( 1908) 193 N.Y. 655, 87 N.E. 1121; State
ex. rel. Grievance Committee v. Woerndle ( 1923) 109
Or. 461, 209 Pac. 604, 220 Pac. 744; Wilhelm's Case ( 1921)
269 Pa. 416, 112 Atl. 560.
"The statutory bar against actions at law has no application to a proceeding for disbarment. Re Simpkins ( 1915)
169 App. Div. 632, 155 N.Y. Supp. 521.
" 'The same principles which authorize the court to
entertain charges against an attorney of violating his professional duties, irrespective of any civil or criminal proceedings against him, render the bar of the Statute of
Limitations against a civil or criminal proceeding an immaterial element.' Ex parte Tyler ( 1895) 107 Cal. 78, 40
Pac. 33.
" 'The Statute of Limitations has no application to
delinquencies such as have been shown to exist. The court
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in such cases, will consider any unexplained, unreasonable
delay in presenting the charges, and also whether, by
reason of such delay, the accused has been deprived of a
fair opportunity of securing proof to meet the accusation;
but the proceeding for the disbarment of an attorney is not
barred by the express terms of the Statute of Limitations,
nor will the courts establish a limitation as to the time in
which such proceedings may be instituted, by analogy to
the Statute of Limitations, unless, from the nature of the
circumstances of the particular case, it appears that it
would be unjust or unfair to require the attorney to answer
as to such occurrences.' People ex. rel. Healy v. Hooper
( 1905) 218 Ill. 313, 75 N.E. 896.
" 'It is contended that the proceeding was barred by
some statute of limitations, but the accused points out no
particular limitations applicable to cases of this character.
Staleness in a charge against an attorney might prevent its
being considered, because an unreasonable delay in the
presentation of a charge of misconduct might make it
impossible for an attorney to procure witnesses or the testimony which would have been available at an earlier
time to meet such charge; but the Statute of Limitations
itself is no defense to such a proceeding.' Re Smith ( 1906)
73 Kan. 743, 85 Pac. 584." Annotation, Statutory Limitation
of time for disbarment proceeding, 45 A.L.R. 1111.
It is clear, therefore, in this case that the defense of the
statute of limitations is not available to Mr. Bridwell.
POINT II.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
AND THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE CORRECT.
This court in the case of In re Macfarlane, 350 P.2d 631, 10
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Utah 2d 217 ( 1960), defined its position with regard to the
review of Bar Commission findings:
" ( 3, 4) It is true that this court would not follow
the finding and recommendation of the Commission if it
appeared to be arbitrary, nor unless it was supported by
substantial evidence. But it is quite impractical to expect
that there be a review of the mental process by which the
conclusion was arrived at. We are not concerned with the
niceties of the term 'presumption' but with a survey of
the foundational facts and whether reasonable minds
might regard the overall picture as meeting the required
standard of proof that respondent engaged in unprofessional conduct.
0

" ( 5, 6) On this problem it is relevant to observe that
the propriety of the questioned conduct must necessarily
be directed to the good conscience and ethical and moral
standards of members of the Bar, and that the Bar Commissioners as its elected representatives are peculiarly
suited to be the arbiters of such standards. They are
vitally concerned with the general conduct of the Bar
and its public relations and are also seriously concerned
with a charge against a fellow member such as that involved in the instant proceeding.
"It is basic that the responsibility is upon the Bar and
the courts to supervise those licensed to practice and to
disbar, suspend or discipline those guilty of infractions of
proper standards because the practice of law is not a right
accorded all citizens, but is a privilege extended only upon
showing good character, meeting required qualifications
and maintaining proper professional standards. In the
prudent e~ercise of the power to discipline in order to
maintain such standards lies the protection of the public
and of the Bar itself.
" ( 7)

We accept the fact that the final responsibility
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is upon this court and that this involves more than mere
rubber stamp endorsement of the actions of the Commission. Nevertheless, because of the considerations just discussed, we deem it discreet and proper to indulge
considerable latitude to the actions and judgment of the
Commission in such matters and would not disregard its
finding and recommendation in the absence of some persuasive reason for doing so."
The writer submits that the Findings of Fact made by
the Disciplinary Committee and affirmed by the Bar Commission are supported by substantial evidence. There is no "persuasive reason" to disregard the Commission's Findings. Based
on the standard set by the Macfarlane case, the Findings and
Conclusions should be sustained.

A.

Threats and Coercion

The Commission's first Finding was:
"a. That the attorney in the cablegrams and letters
offered in evidence, used threats and coercion without
explanation to extract an additional $2,000.00 fee; that no
emergency circumstances existed justifying the coercion
exercised (See exhibits 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15)."
The Finding is supported by Exhibits 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and
15. Exhibit 10 is a cablegram from Bridwell to Wagner, dated
August 3, 1961, in which Bridwell states:
"Received your letter of July 26 and contents noted
under no circumstances are you to return now new developments make mandatory you send two thousand dollars
to me at once personal conference urgent and imperative
further letters useless your continued total confidence
necessary or I must withdraw."
Bridwell does not hint at what the new developments are
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and indicates he will withdraw as counsel unless the money
is sent.

Exhibit 11 is a letter elated August 3, 1961, from Wagner
in Switzerland to Bridwell in Salt Lake City in response to the
cablegram. Wagner refuses to send the $2,000 but asks Bridwell
to come to Basel for a Conference. He requests that Bridwell
send him annual reports of the corporation for 19.58-.59-60 and a
copy of the final settlement with the government on the tax
case. It is remarkable that Bridwell would ask for another
$2,000 after he had completely depleted the corporation's bank
account and yet not given his client an annual financial report
for three years.
Exhibit 12 is another cablegram, dated August 8, 1961,
from Bridwell to Wagner reading:
"August 3rd letter received and noted imperative for
many important reasons you send 2000 dollars at once you
will fully agree when I see you."
In the five days between the first and second cablegrams,
Bridwell had not seen fit to write Wagner a letter and describe
any of the "many important reasons" why Wagner should send
$2,000 "at once".
Exhibit 13 is an undated letter from Wagner to Bridwell
in response to the second cablegram stating that he can't send
$2,000 because he does not have it. He advises he would borrow
the money from the bank if Bridwell would send him "detailed
information what the money is intended for," so that he could
explain the need for the loan to the bank. He writes: "The Utah
corporation must have assets" and suggests Bridwell take $2,000
from the corporation account and charge it to him. Though
the corporation account had been depleted approximately two
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years before, Bridwell still has not informed him that the corporation is without funds. Again Wagner requests the annual
reports.
Exhibit 14 is an insulting, intemperate, threatening cablegram, sent by Bridwell to his client:
"Letter of August eighth received and noted you don't
seem to understand English language no more argument
or excuses or you may loose [sic] five years of work and
gain a life of exile do exactly repeat exactly as stated or
forget it and I will then later be at liberty to write you full
details on why your house of cards fell."
Never did Bridwell in his testimony delineate what the
emergency was that required him to demand $2,000 from his
client without explanation for its need.
The committee's Finding of Fact is abundantly supported
by the exhibits.

B.

Failure to Account for Sums Received
1.

Dun and Bradstreet Collectwns.

Wagner delivered to Bridwell certain accounts receivable
of the Precisa Calculating Company to be collected. Bridwell
turned them over to Dun and Bradstreet for handling. Bridwell
testilied that:
"I recall Dun and Bradstreet was collecting the accounts. That is all I can recall about it. I do recall that
upon occasion I would get money in the office, checks. I
assume they are from collections . . . . I would take them
down to the factory, down to the plant, and give them to
whoever was there, or if I didn't happen to be dropping
by there, I would mail them to Farmers State Bank." (R.
379-80).
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Bridwell was shown Exhibit 28, a check from Dun and
Bradstreet to Precisa Calculating Machine Company for $225.50,
Exhibit 29 for $79.00 and Exhibit 30 for $78.44. All three had
been endorsed by Bridwell and deposited in his account at
Valley State Bank (R. 216-7; Ex. 44). Bridwell conceded the
endorsement signatures were his ( R. 380) and the checks themselves reveal that they were deposited in the Valley State Bank
in 1958 and 1959. Precisa had not had an account in that bank
since 1952. Bridwell admitted that he did have an account in
that bank at the time the checks were deposited ( R. 400). He
had no recollection of the checks or of making the deposits
and supplied no evidence of ever having accounted for that
money to Precisa or Wagner ( R. 380-1).
Rule II, Section 23, of the Revised Rules of Professional
Conduct of the Utah State Bar provides as follows:
"Section 23. An attorney and counselor rece1vmg
money or property of his client in the course of his professional business, shall pay or deliver the same to the
person entitled thereto within a reasonable time, unless he
has just cause for retaining it."
Rule III, Section 32.11, provides:
"The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby
for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or talces advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
"Money of the client or collected for the client or other
trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer
should be reported and accounted for promptly, and should
not under any circumstances be comingled with his own
or be used by him."
Certainly the handling of the above described checks constituted a violation of those rules.
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2.

Failure to Account for the Use of the $4,000.

The second paragraph of the second Finding of Fact reads
in part as follows :
"That the attorney with authority to incur the expenses
of a trip to Switzerland, took $4,000.00 of the repayment
made by Metropolitan Finance Company and used this
money for that trip, and thereafter never made any accounting to his client itemizing the expenditure of the
$4,000.00."
In the fall of 1958 Bridwell and his accountant, Nielson,
went to Basel, Switzerland, to confer with Wagner ( R. 350-1 ) .
Prior to taking the trip, he did not have any communication
with Wagner concerning expenses for the trip ( R. 351). Sometime after Wagner went to Europe in 1958 and left Bridwell
in charge of Precisa's bank account, Bridwell withdrew $10,000
from the account and loaned it to Metropolitan Finance
Company ( R. 399; Ex. 26), a company operated by his friend
and client, Robert M. Schubach, who was the company's managing partner. Bridwell' s mother was a partner ( R. 128).

Bridwell testified that it was from Metropolitan Finance
Company that he acquired $4,000 and applied it on the expense
of the 1958 trip ( R. 351, 399).
There is no evidence that any accounting of the expenditure
of the $4,000 was made to Wagner or Precisa except that it
was charged to travel expense in an accounting Nielson sent
to Wagner in 1958 ( R. 302). There is no evidence that any
breakdown of the travel expense was ever given to Wagner or
Precisa. Nielson testified that $2,500 was used for airline tickets
and the remaining $1,500 was converted into travelers' checks
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and taken by Bridwell. Nielso~ simply listed it as t~avel expense
and could not testify beyond that ( R. 302).
This evidence also clearly demonstrates a violation of Rule
III, Section 32.11.
3. Failure to Account Properly for the $15,520 Government
Refund.

The third Finding of Paragraph b of the Committee's Findings of Fact reads as follows:
"That near October 9, 1961, the Federal government
refunded to the attorney $15,520.00 for his client; that the
client made repeated requests of the attorney for an accounting showing the disbursement of said funds, but that
the attorney never made any accounting to the client.
That the attorney advised the client that the funds received
on the government refund were deposited in a trust account for the benefit of Precisa and Wagner which statement was untrue. That after repeated requests by the
client for an accounting one was provided by Accountant
Nielson on October 29, 1962, as reflected in exhibit 36,
indicating the monies had previously been disbursed principally to the attorney and Accountant Nielson."
Sometime between October 9, 1961, (R. 436) and October
14, 1961, Bridwell received a refund check from the Internal
Revenue Service in the amount of $15,220.70 for Precisa (R.
374; Ex. 36). The above dates may be deduced from Bridwell's
testimony ( R. 375 ) :
"I sent a letter to Mr. Joe Thomas of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue on October 14, 1961, telling him fd paid
the taxes on the Redwood Road property and I enclosed
some copies of the Salt Lake County Treasurer's receipts
9381 and 9382, evidencing payment."
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Bridwell's testimony is that he did not inform Wagner of
the receipt of the refund until Wagner returned to Salt Lake
City in November, 1961 ( R. 376). Without notifying Wagner
of the receipt of the refund and without consulting him concerning its disbursement, he used $1,392.34 to pay real property
taxes on the Redwood Road property owned by Precisa ( R.
375), paid Nielson, the accountant, $6,700 and paid himself
$7,428.36 (Ex. 36). Bridwell paid himself the $7,428.36 in spite
of the fact that Wagner had specifically instructed him in
Switzerland in September that he was not to take any in attorney's fees, but that he could pay Nielson $6,000 for accounting
fees ( R. 106); however, that the $6,000 was not to come out of
the refund.
Inasmuch as the Internal Revenue Service mailed the
refund check on September 9, 1961 ( R. 436), it should have
reached Bridwell at least by the 11th or 12th of the month.
He had the $15,520 in his hands on or before the 14th, because
by the 14th he had used part of it to pay the taxes on the Redwood property, and on the 14th wrote the Internal Revenue
Service to that effect.
Though he could write the Internal Revenue Service, he
did not choose to write his client at this time and tell him of
the refund, the satisfaction of the taxes, and that it was now
safe for him to come back to the states. Instead, on October
12, 1961, he wrote his client a remarkable letter (Ex. 16). It
said nothing about the receipt and disbursement of the $15,000.
Instead, he said: "I have no way of knowing when I would
recommend that you return to the United States." However,
he believed the tax matter would be settled shortly and that
Wagner could return no later than the middle of November.
He mentioned the taxes on the Redwood Road property, but
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did not reveal that they were paid. He told Wagner that he
had informed the Internal Revenue Service he would lend
Precisa the money to pay the Redwood ,Road taxes, when in
fact he had either already paid the taxes or did pay them within
the next two days out of the refund received from the Internal
Revenue Service. In that letter he did not inform Wagner that
he had received the refund, if in fact he had, by October 12th.
Rather, he urged Wagner to consult his contacts in Switzerland
and "immediately borrow from them the sum of $25,000" to
buy the building back from his friend and client, Schubach, at
the price of $45,000 - a price at which Schubach would have
made a profit in excess of $20,000. Bridwell's brief admits
Schubach made a profit of $10,000 at the subsequently negotiated price of $35,000. Actually the profit was $10,537.82 ( R.
397 ) . Bridwell's letter is vigorous in Schubach's behalf, urging
the transaction on Wagner. He told Wagner that Schubach
could sell it for $50,000 - "which he is very desirous of doing
and doing rapidly." However, if Wagner "will respond at once
by return mail'', Bridwell could, in effect, get his property back
for him wholesale - $45,000. According to Bridwell's letter,
Wagner should "immediately borrow." He urged: "Please let
me hear at once.... I suggest that you immediately start checking into the financial arrangements on this and if you are interested, let's complete the entire transaction before you come
back." (Emphasis supplied by Bridwell). If we assume the
letter from the Internal Revenue Service was late, giving Bridwell the benefit of any doubt, and assuming that he received
the $15,520 on the 12th, 13th or 14th after he wrote this letter,
he did not promptly after the receipt of the money inform
Wagner of that fact. He kept the information secret, allowing
Wagner, if he had been so disposed, to contact his friends,
borrow $25,000 and send it to Bridwell before "he came back'"
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and before he knew of the refund and the manner of its disbursement.
However, if Bridwell's own testimony is accurate, he had
received the refund prior to sending his October 12, 1961 letter
( Ex. 16). He testified as follows:
"They ( I.RS.) were going to attach this property
(Redwood Road) and sell it to them for that. Taxes had
not been paid on it by Mr. Wagner for some time. I told
the people of the I.RS. - I had received the refund check
by this time - that I was going to loan Mr. Wagner enough
money to pay those taxes and in turn they agreed with
me that they would give a reasonable time in that event
for Mr. Wagner to make payments." (Emphasis supplied)
(R 374-5).
Then on October 12, Bridwell, who had already received
the $15,520, wrote Wagner that he had told the Internal Revenue
Service he was going to lend him (Wagner) the money to pay
the taxes; then Bridwell paid the taxes out of the refund, and
on October 14, informed the Internal Revenue Service that the
taxes had been paid, sending them the receipts. In other words,
Bridwell took the position in his own mind that the $15,520
belonged to him. Out of it he paid his accountant $6,700 and
'1oaned" Wagner or Precisa $1,392.34 to pay the taxes on the
Redwood property. But he. did not explain this to Wagner. He
secluded from Wagner the receipt of the refund until November,
1961, and then secreted its disbursement until his accountant's
letter of October 29, 1962 (Ex. 36). It is clear that from the
moment of his receipt of the $15,520 he intended to treat it as
his own money, pay Nielson what he owed him out of it and
retain the remainder except the $1,392.34 which he loaned to
Wagner to pay the taxes on the Redwood property.
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Two weeks went by during which time Wagner offered to
pay Schubach $38,000. Then on October 27, 1961, Bridwell
wrote his next remarkable letter (Ex. 17) to Wagner, telling
him he could come home and liquidate the Redwood Road
property to pay the $17,364.21 he still owed the Inte~al Revenue
Service. Bridwell had by this time divided approximately
$14,000 of the $15,520 between Nielson and himself and he
still did not in the letter of October 27 tell Wagner about it.
Then on behalf of his client Schubach, he urged his client
Wagner to pay $42,000 to repurchase the building. He said:
". . . Would suggest to you that you make immediate
arrangements with the Handwerker Bank to forthwith
send the $42,000 so that these matters may be resolved at
once and we can all go forward and upward."
Bridwell obviously wanted the sale concluded, the papers
signed and the money in Schubach's hands before Wagner
could get back to Salt Lake City.
But Wagner returned and eventually, in December of 1961,
handled the negotiations himself with Schubach and got the
property back for $35,000 and Schubach made only a $10,500
profit.
In November Wagner asked Bridwell where the refund
money was and Bridwell told him it was in his attorney's trust
account in his office ( R. 204). Wagner told him that he wanted

the money put in a checking account in the Farmers State Banlc
in the name of the corporation, requiring two signatures, his
and Bridwell's (R. 204). Bridwell ignored the instruction.. On
December 25, 1961, Wagner wrote Bridwell stating:
"I want to see that money to be put in a checking
account in the name of the corporation with two signatures necessary to draw; namely, you and I." (Ex. 41)
Bridwell ignored the letter.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
For the next nine months, Wagner tried in vain to induce
Bridwell to make an accounting. On August 30, 1962, he demanded Bridwell surrender the cash and he consulted Attorney
Max Mangum of Salt Lake, seeking his assistance to obtain an
accounting. Mangum contacted Bridwell. Bridwell stated he
did not want to meet Wagner and had his secretary deliver to
Mangum's office a minute book, a folder of correspondence
and an envelope containing a few "statistic sheets". No cash
was delivered and the refund amount was still unaccounted for.
Wagner described the above in his letter dated September 24,
1962 (Ex. 42) in which he charged Bridwell with embezzlement
and threatened to call on the Bar Association for help.
Finally, by letter from the accountant Nielson to Wagner,
dated October 29, 1962 (Ex. 36) Wagner finally learned what
had happened to the $15,520, more than a year after Bridwell
had received it. It was then that the frustrated Wagner made
his complaint to the Bar Association.
Bridwell's conduct in connection with the refund violates
Rule III, Section 32.12 of the Rules of Practice, and the evidence
clearly supports the Committee's Finding of Fact.

C. Chandelier Incident.
Paragraph c of the Committee's Findings is as follows:
"The attorney's request to a government auctioneer
to withh~ld a chandelier from the sale and the attorney's
purchase of the chandelier on the following day when no
other competitive bidders were expected to be present
was a representation of conflicting interests."
The chandelier had considerable sentimental and some
economic value to Wagner. Bridwell in his testimony simply
admits that he paid $150 for the chandelier and gave it to a
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friend ( R. 388-9), and he has made no effort to get it back for
\Vagner.
Based on Bridwell's own admission, the conflict of interest
between himself and his client is obvious and the Committee's
Finding is supported by the evidence.

D. Conflict Involving Sale and Repurchase of Building.
Paragraph e of the Committee's Findings reads as follows:
"e. As amended to relate to conflict of interest. That
the attorney did in fact represent both Schubach and
Wagner and Precisa companies, and there is evidence
that he related to Wagner and Precisa Company that he
had taken steps to protect the building so that they could
regain possession. That the attorney in exercising the
option on behalf of Precisa and in signing that interest to
Schubach who subsequently made a $10,000.00 profit on
the transaction was contrary to the best interest of his
client, Wagner and Precisa. That the interests of Schubach
and Precisa and Wagner were hostile to each other, and
the attorney's representation of both parties constituted a
breach of his duty to his client and a representation of conflicting interests."
Precisa owned an equity in a building at 375 West 4th
South, Salt Lake City. It was the place of business of the company in Utah. A mortgage was held by N. R. and Johanna Hines.
Precisa was purchasing under contract (Ex. 19B). When Bridwell by 1959 had withdrawn all of the money out of Precisa's
bank account to pay his own fees and expenses, there were no
funds left to make payments on the contract. Hines foreclosed.
Bridwell acquired an option for repurchase by Precisa. Then
without the knowledge or consent of Precisa or Wagner, he
sold the option to his friend and client, Schubach (Ex. 19A & B).
Facts concerning this transaction were not communicated to
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Wagner or Precisa until Bridwell's letter to Wagner in May,
1961. Then by the letters of October 12 and 27, 1961 ( Exs. 16
and 17) Bridwell urged vVagner to pay a premium to repurchase
the building. I have already discussed those letters and their
significance at length in a previous section of this brief.
Rule III, Section 32.6, second paragraph, of Revised Rules
of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar, provides as
follows:
"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests,
except by express consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this
canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when in
behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires him to oppose."
It is clear that Bridwell was in violation of the conflict
provision, and substantial evidence supports the Committee's
Finding in that regard.

E. Unauthorized Withdrawal of Funds for Attorney's Fees.
The first paragraph of Section g of the Findings of Fact
reads as follows:
"g. That the attorney's withdrawal of sums of money
(except the original $14,000.00) from the client's corporate
assets for additional legal fees was without the authorization or knowledge of the client. That there was some
discussion between the attorney and the client that there
may be additional sums to be paid on the attorney's fees,
but there was no authorization nor knowledge as to withdrawal or use of funds under the attorney's control as
attorney's fees exceeding the $14,000.00 original figure.
That the records indicate that $19,425.00 and $4,000.00
had already been taken by the attorney before the first
trip to Switzerland when the necessity for additional attor-
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ney's fees were verbally discussed. Among the evidence
which sustains this see exhibits C, E, F, and 46."
Bridwell's Exhibit F details the withdrawals made which
constituted payments to himself. It reveals that Bridwell had
paid himself $19,425 prior to his second visit to Switzerland in
September, 1961 (Ex. F; R. 429). Exhibit C and Bridwell's testimony disclosed that he had taken an additional $4,000 ostensibly to pay expenses for him and Nielson to go to Europe (R.
352; Ex. C).
The testimony of Wagner is that up to the time of the
European trip only $17,000 in withdrawals had been authorized
(R. 70).
Bridwell's admissions under examination by Mr. Van Wagenen, member of the Committee, confirms his withdrawals of
fees without authorization.
"MR. VAN WAGENEN: Yes. In going over Exhibit
F, which was a calculation prepared by, I believe, Mr.
Nielson indicating the Precisa checks to you, Mr. Bridwell,
if my calculations are correct, as of the date that you went
on this trip you had already drawn $19,425.00, not including the $4,000.00 check for the travel expenses.
"THE WITNESS: The four thousand is for travel.
"MR. VAN WAGENEN: Yes, but up to that point
you had already drawn from the company $19,425.00.
"THE WITNESS: Whatever the exhibits reflect.
"MR. VAN W AGENEN: Can you explain any authority for doing that?
''THE WITNESS: I just didn't assume there'd be any
problem because of the increased workload. Nobody Io:1ew
what was going on when it first happened and I - possibly
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it could have been -

I don't have any documentation.
Again, I've looked an<l looked. Maybe that was discussed
over the phone. I don't say that it was but it could have
been. I just don't know.

"MR. VAN W AGENEN: But you don't recall any
specific authorization?
"THE WITNESS: No sir." (R. 407-8).
In Section 3 of this brief I have already discussed the
unauthorized acquisition of an additional $7,428.36 fee accomplished by Bridwell in October, 1961.

The Committee's Finding on this subject is supported by
substantial evidence.

F. The Exoneration Minutes.
The second paragraph of Section g of the Findings of Fact
reads as follows:
"That the action of the attorney in preparing and
securing the adoption of minutes of the stockholders meeting in Switzerland were for the protection of the attorney
in an effort to exonerate himself from any wrongdoing or
excuse any previous conduct for which he felt he might
ultimately have some responsibility to his client."
Concerning Bridwell's reasons for taking the September,
1961 trip to Switzerland, he testified that there were two main
reasons. The first was, he said, to prove that the building was
lost to the corporation and that the sale to Schubach was bona
fide. The second was to get the affidavit (Ex. E) signed. With
respect to the first reason, he testified:

"Q. All right. Now, getting down to the precise
reason that you felt that it was necessary for you to go to
Switzerland in August of 1961, will you tell us about that?
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"A. Well, in my varied conferences with these people
they didn't believe that the building was lost to the corporation. They didn't think it was a bona fide transaction
with Schubach for one thing." ( R. 357)
Bridwell is not being candid in that testimony because all
of the tax cases against the corporation had been settled by
May 29, 1961 (R. 435). All cases against Wagner personally had
been settled by that date except a case involving his 1957 taxes
( R. 4.35-6). Consequently, by May 29, 1961, the Internal Revenue
Service had allowed the loss of the building as claimed. There
was no need to go to Europe to get minutes or a power of
attorney or an affidavit to support that claim.
With respect to the affidavit he testified:
"The reason I felt it necessary to go was - and also
by the time I went I was pretty much assured I was going
to be able to work out these 1957 tax problems and I
wanted to make certain, for one thing, that - to have the
backing of an executed Exhibit E which I didn't have."
(R. 358)
Exhibit E, the affidavit which he wanted the Precisa personnel to sign, had nothing to do with the power of attorney
and the self-serving minutes he drafted and got executed. He
never did get the affidavit signed, but he devoted a substantial
part of his time to getting the whitewashing minutes executed.
He coerced Wagner into signing them and into inducing his
colleagues to sign them by threatening Wagner "with permanent exile" from the United States (Ex. 221, Ex. 14). He did
this, knowing as he stated in his testimony ( R. 358) that:
"By the time I went I was pretty much assured I was
going to be able to work out these 1957 tax problems."
Those were the only problems left to be resolved. Yet
knowing that, he scared Wagner into approving and getting
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his fellow stockholders to approve his self-serving minutes.
"Being pretty much assured" he was "going to be able to work
out these 1957 tax problems", he cabled Wagner in August,
1961:
"Letter of August eighth received and noted you
don't seem to understand English language no more argument or excuses or you may loose [sic] five years of work
and gain a life of exile do exactly repeat exactly as stated
or forget it and I will then later be at liberty to write you
full details on why your house of cards fell." (Ex. 14).
Now we know why it was "imperative for many important
reasons you send $2,000 at once" (Ex. 12). Bridwell had the
corporation's tax cases wrapped up but he wanted the exonerating minutes executed and the sale to his client friend, Schubach,
ratified before Wagner returned to Salt Lake.
Substantial evidence supports the Finding of the Committee that the minutes were for the "protection of the attorney
in an effort to exonerate himself."

G.

Improvement of the Attorney's Home.

Finding h of the Committee reads as follows:
"h. That the attorney accepted labor and materials
for the improvement of the attorney's home from a contractor tenant of the client's corporation and then credited
the tenant with the value of said labor and materials on
the tenant's rent, which rent should have been paid to
the client's corporation."
Bridwell by his own testimony admits the guilt of this
charge ( R. 408-9).
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CONCLUSION
The three lawyers on the Disciplinary Committee who acted
as judges are recognized as experienced and capable trial counsel. They have had many years of experience in judging the
credibility of witnesses and weighing and evaluating evidence.
They were there and saw and heard Wagner and Bridwell
testify. They are in the best position to assess the veracity of
the testimony. They were able to observe, as this brief has
pointed out, that Bridwell in most instances condemned himself
with his own testimony and his own exhibits. They were
patient and liberal in their rulings on evidence, giving Bridwell
a full and fair hearing. There is substantial evidence to support
their findings.
The members of the Bar Commission reviewed the record,
confirmed the Committee's Findings and Conclusions, and entered an Order recommending disbarment. Then the Commission
at the request of Bridwell reopened and reconsidered, permitted
reargument and renewed their order recommending disbarment.
The recommendation of the Commission should be implemented by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
MARVIN J. BERTOCH
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
RICHARD R. BOYLE
336 South 3rd East
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Prosecuting
Committee
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